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An application of quadratic functions to  
Australian Government policy on funding schools 
 
Rodney Nillsen∗
School of Mathematics and Applied Statistics 
University of Wollongong 
 
In the Sydney Morning Herald of 23rd  March 2005 Ross Gittins [1] argued that 
the funding arrangements for private schools positively encourage parents to move 
their children from the state system. The Federal Minister for Education, Dr Brendan 
Nelson, in a letter to the Herald of 25th − 27th  March, responded by saying that 68% of 
all school pupils go to state schools, and those students receive 76% of Government 
funds allocated to the totality of all pupils attending schools. He stated also that the 
policy of subsidizing pupils who went to a private school resulted in taxpayer savings 
of $4 billion [2]. However, the Minister’s response did not address the extent to which 
more money could possibly be saved by having a different subsidy from the one 
currently offered by the Government.   
There are two conflicting factors in offering subsides to private school pupils. 
On the one hand, the greater the subsidy per pupil the more pupils will enrol in private 
schools. On the other hand, the greater the subsidy per pupil the less money will be 
saved each time a pupil enrols in a private school. How do these factors balance out, 
and where would an optimal subsidy occur? The problem is closely related to other 
problems of optimization that arise in business, industry and public policy. 
Mathematically, the problem can be modelled by means of a quadratic function that 
describes how the savings change as the subsidy changes. 
 
Calculation of the current subsidy   
Let m pupils go to state schools and n pupils go to private schools. Then, the 
proportion of pupils going to state schools is θ , where  
θ =
m
m + n
. (1) 
Assume that for each state school pupil, the Government will pay an amount a. Assume 
also that for each private school pupil, the Government will subsidise that pupil at an 
amount s. The proportion of Government funds spent on the state school system, out of 
the total of all Government funds spent on both state and private schools is φ , where  
φ =
ma
ma + ns
. (2) 
A routine calculation using (1) and (2) gives  
s
a
=
−1+ 1
φ
−1+ 1
θ
. (3) 
The Minister’s figures in the Herald [2] give θ = 17
25
and φ =
19
25
. Based on this and 
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allowing for round-off in the Minister’s figures, we have from (3) that  
s = 2
3
a. (4) 
 
The mathematical analysis of savings  
Since the Government pays an amount a for each state school pupil and pays a 
subsidy s for each private school pupil, for each private pupil, the Government saves an 
amount a − s. At the subsidy s , let g(s) denote the number of pupils who enrol in 
private schools. The function g is taken to be increasing for, if a greater subsidy is 
offered, a greater number of pupils would be expected to enrol in the private system. 
Then, the total amount saved by the Government is a − s for each pupil times g(s) , the 
number of pupils in the private system. So, the total amount saved with the subsidy s is 
S(s) , where  
S(s) = g(s)(a − s). (5) 
Note that S(s) ≥ 0 and S(a) = 0. In (5), formally s can take any real value, but it is 
assumed that the subsidy offered by the Government lies in the interval [0,a], for a 
negative subsidy would mean a tax on people sending their children to a private school, 
while a subsidy greater than a would mean the Government would be paying more for a 
pupil going to private school than to a state school. Equation (5) shows that the savings 
function S is comprised of two contradictory tendencies, for g(s) increases as s
increases, but a − s decreases  as s increases.  
Savings will be maximised when the function S has a maximum over the 
interval [0,a] . A Government wishing to maximise savings without regard for 
anything else should try to find the level of subsidy where this maximum will occur.  
The simplest choice for g is a linear function. We let N0 be the number of 
pupils who enrol in the private system when the subsidy is zero. Thus, N0 = g(0).  The 
value of N0 is a matter of controversy, with some letter writers to the Sydney Morning 
Herald holding that it is in effect 0 [3], while others hold that subsidies have little 
effect and that g(s) is always close to N0 [4]. Also, define N0
′ by putting N0
′ = g(a) . 
Thus, N0
′ is the number of private school pupils who would enrol under the maximum 
subsidy a and we assume that N0
′ > N0 . Thus, g is given in the linear case by  
g(s) = N0 +
N0
′ − N0
a





 s. (6) 
DEFINITION. If N0 > 0 make the definition that ρ =
N0
′
N0
. If N0 = 0 , let 
ρ = ∞ . Thus, ρ > 1 and ρ measures the “sensitivity” of the “market” to subsidies.  
For the time being, ρ is kept as a given constant value, and we shall think later 
about what happens as ρ varies. It follows from (5) and (6) and a routine calculation 
that the savings are given by  
S(s) = N0 +
N0
′ − N0
a





 s





 (a − s) =
N0
a
a + (ρ −1)s( )(a − s),  (7) 
so that S is a quadratic function in s. Hence, we know that the point where S has an 
3
overall maximum is the midpoint of the zeros of S .
Figure 1. Let g(s) be the number of private school enrolments at the 
subsidy s per pupil. The figure shows the graph of g where g is assumed 
linear. 
 
We see from (7) that the zeros of S are at a and −a
ρ −1
, so S has an overall 
maximum value at the mid-point of these two zeros, namely it has a maximum at  
a
2
ρ − 2
ρ −1




. (8) 
Note that this point where the maximum occurs is negative if ρ < 2 , is 0 if ρ = 2 , and 
is in 0,
a
2




if ρ > 2 . As ρ increases, the point where the overall maximum occurs 
increases, changing from negative to positive at ρ = 2 (see Figures 2 and 3). However, 
we are interested in the maximum value of S(s) for 0 ≤ s ≤ a . We put 
 
Smax = max{S(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ a}.
Thus, if 1< ρ ≤ 2 , Smax = S(0) = aN0; while if ρ > 2 , a routine calculation using (8) 
gives  
Smax = S
a
2
ρ − 2
ρ −1








=
N0
a
a + (ρ −1)
a
2
ρ − 2
ρ −1








a −
a
2
ρ − 2
ρ −1








=
aN0ρ
2
4(ρ −1)
. (9) 
Now, we saw in (4) that the subsidy offered by the Government is s = 2a
3
, so the 
savings under current Government policy are S
2a
3




, and we call this value Sgov. We 
let θ be a given number in [0,1) , and first we calculate the difference between the 
maximum possible savings and the savings at the subsidy θa . That is, we calculate 
Smax − S(θa) . There are two cases to consider: 1< ρ ≤ 2 and ρ > 2 .
4
Figure 2. The graph is of the savings S against the subsidy s , in a case where 
1< ρ < 2 . Note that the overall maximum value of the savings is at the 
negative value s =
a
2
ρ − 2
ρ −1




, indicated by the dotted vertical line, while 
the maximum value of S(s) for 0 ≤ s ≤ a occurs when s = 0 . The graph 
illustrates that as ρ increases from 1 to 2 , the subsidy at which the 
maximum savings Smax  occur remains the same at s = 0 .
Figure 3.  The graph is of the savings S against the subsidy s when ρ ≥ 2 .
In this case, the overall maximum savings are the same as the maximum 
savings Smax  for 0 ≤ s ≤ a , and occur when s =
a
2
ρ − 2
ρ −1




, indicated by 
the dotted vertical line, which is between 0 and 
a
2
. Note that 
a
2
is half the 
maximum possible subsidy. Figures 2 and 3 together illustrate that as ρ
increases from 1 to ∞ , the subsidy at which the maximum savings Smax  
occur is at s = 0 for 1< ρ ≤ 2 , and then it increases to s = a
2
as ρ→ ∞ .
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We illustrate what happens in the case ρ > 2 . A routine calculation based on (7), 
(8) and (9) gives  
Smax − S(θa) = S(θa)
Smax
S(θa)
−1




= S(θa) ρ
2
4(ρ −1)
⋅
1
(1+ (ρ −1)θ)(1−θ)
−1




. (10) 
In particular, when θ =
2
3
, equation (10) simplifies to   
Smax − Sgov = Smax − S
2a
3




= S 2a
3




⋅
1
4
ρ2 + 4ρ + 4
2ρ2 − ρ −1




. (11) 
A similar calculation in the case 1< ρ ≤ 2 gives 
Smax − Sgov = Smax − S
2a
3




= S
2a
3




⋅
8 − 2ρ
2ρ +1




. (12) 
Now put 
u(ρ) = 8 − 2ρ
2ρ +1
, for  1<ρ ≤ 2; and u(ρ) = 1
4
ρ2 + 4ρ + 4
2ρ2 − ρ −1




, for  2 < ρ < ∞.
Differentiating u with respect to ρ shows that u is decreasing and we see also that 
u(ρ) → 1/8  as ρ → ∞. The following result is then immediate from (11) and (12). 
THEOREM. For  all 1< ρ < ∞ ,
Smax − Sgov = u(ρ)Sgov ≥
1
8
Sgov.
The value of ρ which would give the impression that current Government 
policy is trying to save the maximum possible amount is when Smax − Sgov  is a 
minimum: that is when ρ = ∞ , corresponding to N0 = 0 and u(ρ) =
1
8
. According to 
the Minister, S gov = $ 4 billion. Thus, at the Government’s current subsidy level, and 
according to the linear model, and assuming ρ = ∞ , we have  
Smax − Sgov =
1
8
Sgov =
1
8
× 4 ×109dollars = $500 million.
In fact, it follows from the theorem above that whatever the value of ρ ,
Smax − Sgov ≥ $500 million.
Thus, under the linear model, $500  million is the smallest amount more that can be 
saved compared with what the Government is currently saving. In fact, this amount is 
most likely greater, as the actual value of ρ is almost certainly comparatively small, 
which means that at the actual value of ρ , Smax − Sgov  is likely to be substantially 
greater than $500  million. In fact, we can try and estimate ρ from the Minister’s data. 
We let N be the total number of pupils in the combined state and private systems. We 
know from the Minister’s figures that 
8N
25
= .32N = g
2a
3










, so (6) gives  
8
25
N = N0 +
2
3
N0
′ − N0



 =
N0
3
+
2N0
′
3
.
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Hence,  
ρ =
N0
′
N0
=
3
2
8
25
N
N0
−
1
3




=
12
25
N
N0




−
1
2
. (13) 
Although it seems difficult to estimate ρ , we may feel more comfortable in estimating 
N0
N
, which is the ratio telling us the proportion of school pupils who would go to a 
private school even if there were no subsidy. For example if we think that 20% of pupils 
would go to private schools even if there were no subsidy, (13) would give ρ = 1.9 , and 
then the equation Smax − Sgov = u(ρ)Sgov  tells us that the Government could save $3,500 
million more than it currently is, under the linear model. However, if we think that 10% 
of pupils would go to private schools even if there were no subsidy, the Government 
could save $1,252 million more than it currently is, under the linear model.  
 
Limitations of the analysis and conclusions   
If the function g is assumed non-linear the point where savings are maximised 
may be quite different from that in the linear case. However, the linear model is widely 
used in economics. The analysis takes no account of the differing circumstances 
between different schools, nor does the analysis take account of the splitting of school 
funding between state and federal Governments. The analysis is based solely on the 
three items of data given by the Minister. Even so, the analysis is strongly suggestive 
that the saving of public funds in this area is an incidental effect of policy, rather than its 
purpose. The analysis presented here is a particular approach to what is a special case of 
a supply and demand problem. Such problems occur widely wherever one is tying to 
optimise a quantity in the face of conflicting tendencies and, with appropriate changes, 
possibly they may be tackled by an adaptation of the techniques described in this paper. 
Three possible areas are: maximising profit in retailing, where there are conflicting 
tendencies between the price of an item and the number of items one can expect to sell 
at that price; taxation policy, where there are conflicting tendencies between the 
amount of income tax collected and the incentive to work (this is related to the “Laffer 
curve” which featured in tax policy under US President Ronald Reagan); and university 
enrolments, where there are conflicting tendencies between the cost to a student of 
enrolling and the number of students who enrol. Further details of the analysis and 
material related to school mathematics may be found on the author’s website (see 
below). 
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